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Abstract—Security can be seen as an optimisation objective in
NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against
other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper,
we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type
of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the
correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as
packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the
functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the
transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint
on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific
parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it.
We therefore propose packet route randomisation as a mech-
anism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks,
focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach
upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital de-
sign requirement. Using an evolutionary optimisation approach,
we show how to effectively apply route randomisation in such
a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its
impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive
experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models
supports our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The design of Network-on-Chip (NoC) interconnects for
embedded systems requires the careful balance of multiple
trade-offs. Over the past decades, a significant amount of work
has addressed the trade-offs between performance and other
secondary objectives such as energy [24], fault-tolerance [17],
and chip area [16]. Less work has addressed such trade-
offs in NoCs with hard real-time constraints, with some
inroads towards improving energy [18] and area efficiency (by
optimising buffering in virtual channels [14]) while meeting
deadlines of all packets even in the worst-case scenario.
In this paper, we consider NoCs with hard real-time con-
straints, and address a novel trade-off that has increasing
importance in embedded systems: security. Because of their
key role in interconnecting the multiple components of an
embedded system, NoCs can be seen as a major security vul-
nerability. If an attacker can extract information from the NoC
interconnect, they can potentially compromise the security of
the complete embedded system. Therefore, many mechanisms
have been designed to improve NoC security (as reviewed in
Section II) and many more will certainly be developed in the
coming years. However, most of such mechanisms impose per-
formance overheads, and therefore can potentially jeopardise
the ability of the NoC to provide real-time guarantees. So we
argue in this paper that, just like in the previously mentioned
trade-offs, security can be seen as an optimisation objective in
NoC resource management: designers must carefully consider
the resources they have available to increase NoC security
without sacrificing performance guarantees (which in the case
of hard real-time NoCs will always be the primary objective).
The specific problem we address is a security mechanism
that aims to improve the NoC resilience to side-channel
attacks. Such attacks try to break a secure system by gath-
ering information from the system’s timing behaviour, power
consumption, temperature or electromagnetic emissions. Just
like some of the related work [25] [20], we aim to improve
resilience against side channel attacks by randomising the
behaviour of the NoC, aiming to make it difficult for an
attacker to identify patterns and correlations between the
functionality of the system and the timing, power, temperature
and electromagnetic behaviour of the NoC. As expected, such
an approach has a direct impact on NoC resource usage, and
therefore on its real-time guarantees, so we identify techniques
that support NoC designers in improving NoC resilience
against side-channel attacks while still maintaining full system
schedulability.
II. RELATED WORK
Multiprocessor embedded systems are target of attacks by
means of malicious hardware or software [4]. Hardware-
based attacks depend on design-time access to the system,
which is then modified in a way that can be exploited during
operation (e.g. by adding hardware able to leak information
by changing chip temperature [8]). Software-based attacks are
the most common cause of security incidents in such types
of systems [15], and are carried out by malicious software
installed at design time or after deployment.
NoC-based systems have been shown to be vulnerable to a
variety of attacks, both hardware and software-based. Active
NoC attacks, such as code injection [1], malware [5] and
control hijacking [12], or passive NoC attacks, such as side-
channel exploitation, can be used to read sensitive commu-
nications, modify the system behaviour or prevent correct
NoC operation. NoCs are especially vulnerable to side-channel
attacks that exploit traffic interference as timing channels
[26] [20]. The shared nature of NoCs can be exploited by
an attacker to obtain sensitive information. By forcing traffic
collision with sensitive packet flows, an attacker can observe
the throughput variations and infer sensitive data, as shown in
[26] [20] [25].
Randomised arbitration [20], virtual channel allocation [21]
and routing [25] have been investigated and evaluated as
countermeasures against timing attacks. By randomising the
characteristics of sensitive packet flows, it is possible to break
the correlation between the traffic characteristics (e.g. volume
and access patterns) and the sensitive data thus avoiding in-
formation leakage. Among those mechanisms, random routing
has achieved the best levels of security enhancement with the
lowest energy and area overhead [25]. By spreading sensitive
traffic over the NoC, the spatial distribution makes it harder for
compromised cores or external attackers to gather sufficient
side-channel information to infer correlations with sensitive
data.
The focus of state-of-the-art randomisation approaches is
to increase security, and none of those works consider the
performance requirements of the applications. In this paper,
we argue that NoCs supporting real-time applications require
a careful balance of a trade-off between security and perfor-
mance. In most cases, we envisage that the level of security
will be constrained by the NoC’s ability to support attack
countermeasures while at the same time ensuring performance
guarantees to the application.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are the identi-
fication of a test to evaluate whether performance guarantees
can hold under a specific side-channel attack countermeasure
(namely route randomisation), and a technique that uses that
test to better balance the trade-off between performance guar-
antees, resource usage and security.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Network-on-Chip Architecture
While the contribution of this paper can be applied to a
large variety of NoC architectures, we believe it is easier
to explain it with the help of a concrete architecture. We
assume a NoC architecture with a 2D-mesh topology and
wormhole switching protocol, because such features are com-
monly used in embedded systems for their simplicity and
moderate resource overheads. There is a downside to this
choice, which is the difficulty in predicting packet latencies. In
wormhole networks, a packet can be simultaneously occupying
multiple NoC buffers and links, so there is a significant
amount of competition for resources throughout the NoC at
all times. The wide variety of interference patterns makes it
hard to predict how long it takes for a packet to reach its
destination. Different resource arbitration policies can make
such predictions more or less difficult, especially in the case of
hard real-time NoCs when an upper-bound worst-case latency
is needed. Previous work has considered NoC arbitration based
on packet priority [23], time multiplexing [19] and round
robin [2], and has devised analytical models that can be used
to find latency upper-bounds for packet flows transmitted over
such NoCs [11]. Any of those approaches could be used in
this paper, and we chose a priority-arbitrated NoC because
of its ability to provide upper-bound latency guarantees that
are customisable to different levels of packet urgency while
allowing for high NoC link utilisation [9].
B. Threat Model
We assume that the NoC and its interfaces to the cores
are secure. We also assume that secure tasks execute in
secure cores (i.e. cores that do not allow the execution of
unsecured tasks). For this threat model, we assume that the
NoC communicates sensitive information between two secure
tasks, which we refer as the sensitive communication. We
then assume an adversary that has knowledge about the NoC
architecture, about the mapping of secure tasks to (secure)
NoC cores, and is able to gain control of at most two non-
secure NoC cores.
A successfull attack happens when the adversary is able
to infect two cores that can communicate over a route that
intersects with that of the sensitive communication. In that
case, the adversary is able to use one of the infected cores
to inject low priority packets into the NoC towards the
second infected core. The latency interference imposed by the
sensitive communication over the malicious low priority traffic
can provide the attacker with valuable information about the
timing, frequency and volume of the secure communication.
This threat model is not new, and its variations have also
been used in best-effort NoC-based systems by [26] and [21].
The timing nature of the threat is also the same used in hard
real-time uniprocessor systems by [27].
By using a route randomisation approach, it is possible
to prevent the adversary from obtaining accurate information
about the sensitive communication. Since each packet of the
secure communication may follow a different route, only some
of them will be intercepted by the probing packets injected
by the infected cores. Thus, the information about timing,
frequency and volume the attacker can obtain will be less
accurate: inferred frequency and total volume of sensitive
packets will be lower than the real value, since not all packets
will be detected by the attacker; inferred timing will deviate
from the real value because the amount of blocking that a
sensitive packet could suffer will have more variability due to
the randomness of the routes of the packets that may block
them. This, as a consequence, increases the resilience of the
NoC against the threat. There are many ways to introduce
route randomisation in NoCs, and we will discuss our design
decisions in subsection IV-A.
Figure 1 shows an example of the described threat model.
It shows an adversary controlling cores F and G, and using a
malicious packet flow (shown as a purple dashed line) to infer
data about a sensitive communication between secure cores C
A 
D 
B 
C 
E 
F G 
Fig. 1: Threat model, and examples of route randomisation
with pseudo-adaptive XY (from A to B) and west-first (from
C to D and C to E) algorithms
and E (shown as a red dotted line, representing the case of
a NoC with deterministic XY routing). In the case of a NoC
with randomised routing, all routes between C and E will be
used (red dashed and dotted lines), preventing the adversary
from inspecting the complete sensitive communication.
C. System Model
To increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks
while providing hard real-time guarantees to the application
tasks running on it, we must make assumptions about the
application behaviour such as upper-bounds on resource us-
age by every application task and packet. In this paper, we
follow the well-known and widely used sporadic task model,
which makes assumptions about the worst-case execution time
(WCET) of all tasks and their shortest inter-arrival interval (i.e.
their period). Since we are concerned about NoC communi-
cations, we follow an extension of the sporadic task model
that considers that tasks inject packets to the NoC only after
their execution completes, and that the maximum packet size
is known [9].
Thus, a hard real-time application Γ comprises n real-time
tasks Γ ={τ1, τ2, . . . , τn}. Each task τi is a 6-tuple τi = (Ci,
Ti, Di, Ji, Pi, {φi}) indicating respectively its worst case
computation time, period, deadline, release jitter and priority.
The sixth element of the tuple is an extension to the sporadic
task model proposed by [9], and represents the communication
packets sent by τi at the end of its execution. Each packet φi is
defined as a 3-tuple φi = (τd,Zi,Ki) representing its destination
task, size and maximum release jitter. In this paper, we assume
for simplicity that a single packet is released at the end of each
execution of each task, but the contributions presented here can
be generalised for any number of released packets.
Such applications are executed over a NoC platform like
the one described in subsection III-A above. We model such
a platform as a set of cores Π ={pia, pib, . . . , piz}, a set of
switches Ξ ={ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξm}, and a set of unidirectional links
Λ ={λa1, λ1a, λ12, λ21, . . . , λzm, λmz}. We also model the
mapping of tasks to cores with the function map(τi) = pia.
The routing of packets over the NoC can be modelled by
the function route(pia, pib) = {λa1, λ12, . . . , λmb}, denoting
the subset of Λ used to transfer packets from core pia to
core pib. We can then extend the function map to also
model the mapping of a packet to its route: map(φi) =
route(map(τi),map(τd)).
With the knowledge of the NoC architectural characteristics
such as the latency to cross a link or to route a packet header,
and with the knowledge of the length of a packet’s route (i.e.
its hop count, or |route(pia, pib)| as expressed in [9]), it is
possible to calculate the no-load latency Li of every packet φi:
the time it takes to completely cross the NoC from its source to
destination without any interference or contention from other
packets. For the NoC described in subsection III-A, and for
most commercial and academic NoCs, the no-load latency of a
packet can be deterministically obtained, and will not change
if its route and the NoC operation frequency do not change.
IV. NOC ROUTING RANDOMISATION
A. Design Choices and Constraints
The architecture of a NoC defines whether and how it
can implement route randomisation. For example, some NoC
architectures use deterministic routing [13], meaning that there
is only one possible route between a source and a destination,
effectively preventing the approach proposed here. Among
NoCs supporting dynamic or adaptive routing, which are the
ones we target, there is a key design choice affecting the
randomisation approach: source or distributed routing.
In source-routed NoCs, the routing decision is done by the
source core or its respective NI. This is usually implemented
as multiple packet header flits that contain the next-hop
information for each of the switches along the packet’s route.
Once a switch routes one of the packet headers by assigning
its output port, it discards that header flit and forwards the rest
of the packet through that port. The next switch will route the
subsequent header flit, discard it, forward the rest of the packet,
and this is repeated all the way towards the packet destination.
By following this approach, it is possible to program the source
core or its NI to perform full route randomisation before every
packet release.
In NoCs with distributed routing, the next-hop decision is
made by each switch individually. Typically, they have far
less resources than the cores (and often than the NIs), so
the routing decisions are based on simple rules related to
the relative position of the destination core with regards to
the switch holding the packet header (e.g. pseudo-adaptive
XY [3], turn model [6]). In those cases, it is only possible
to randomly choose from a predefined subset of all possible
routes. For instance, pseudo-adaptive XY switches can only
randomly choose between two routes between a source and
a destination (e.g. routes between cores A and B in Figure
1). Switches implementing turn model routing may have a
larger number of alternative routes to randomly choose from in
most cases, but must behave deterministically for some specific
cases. Figure 1 shows two routes created by a west-first turn
model: packets between core C and D have only one possible
route, as the destination is located on the west of the source,
while packets from core C to E can take a variety of possible
routes.
In both source and distributed routing, the NoC component
making random decisions must have access to a source of
random data, such as a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG, generated by a deterministic algorithm) or a true
random number generator (TRNG, often generated out of
low level noise signals). Such sources can have significant
hardware overhead, thus favouring source routing because of
the low area constraints for NoC switches.
Additional issues when randomising packet routes include
the potential increase of the packet route, the possibility of
deadlocks, and the potential increase of packet latency (and
therefore the potential violation of real-time constraints). Let
us now address each of them.
All the routing approaches reviewed above are minimal: the
route they choose has the smallest possible hop count between
source and destination. This is because of their obvious
advantages in terms of latency, network contention and energy
dissipation. However, from the point of view of side-channel
attack resilience, it may be interesting to exploit non-minimal
randomised routing in order to decorrelate the side channels
with the functional properties of the packet communication
(e.g. short packet transmission between neighbouring cores
would not necessarily have the shortest latency and lowest
energy dissipation if they are forced to take a long route across
the chip).
Deadlock-free packet communication is a critical character-
istic for NoCs. This can be achieved at the link arbitration
layer, e.g. with priority-preemptive virtual channels [9], or
at the network layer by restricting the possible turns of the
routing algorithm (either in source or in distributed routing).
In NoCs that ensure deadlock-freeness at the network layer,
special care must be taken by the route randomisation ap-
proach to avoid introducing turns that can lead to deadlocks.
Finally, route randomisation is likely to change the laten-
cies of packets, both because for every release their routes
may have different hop counts (leading to different no-load
latencies) and because different routes may trigger different
contention scenarios (leading to different blocking times). In
our approach, such variability is actually desirable because
it is a key aspect to increasing the NoC’s resilience against
side channel attacks. In the case of hard real-time systems,
however, it is critical that such variability is bounded and that
the worst-case latencies of all packets are always less than their
deadlines. In the next subsection, we propose an extension to
existing schedulability analysis to evaluate if that is the case
for a given application mapped to a given NoC architecture.
The proposed approach is simple, yet general enough to
analyse randomised routing approaches following any of the
design choices reviewed above: source or distributed, minimal
or non-minimal, and with deadline-freeness ensured at the link
or network layer.
B. Schedulability Analysis
Schedulability analysis for a set of sporadic packets trans-
ferred over a priority-preemptive wormhole switching NoC
was presented in [22]. A set of packets is deemed schedulable
if the worst-case latency of each packet is less than their
deadline. By coupling that analysis with classical response
time analysis for uniprocessor fixed-priority scheduling, an
end-to-end schedulability analysis for that type of NoC was
proposed in [9], considering the worst-case response times of
tasks and the worst-case latency of the packets they generate.
Both the original analysis from [22] and the end-to-end exten-
sion from [9] assume static routing, so a different formulation
is needed before it can be used for the purpose of this paper.
First, we review those formulations, but using the notation
described in subsection III-C.
According to [22], the worst-case latency Si of a packet
φi can be obtained from Equation 1. This equation is defined
recursively and iterated until a stable fixed point is discovered.
Si = Li +
∑
φj∈interf(i)
⌈
Si +Kj +K
I
j
Tj
⌉
Lj , (1)
The set interf(i) is the set of higher priority packets φj
whose route shares at least one link with the route of φi
and therefore can interfere with it. Precisely, interf(i) =
{φj ∈ φ : map(φi) ∩ map(φj) 6= ∅}. The two terms Kj
and KIj denote respectively the maximum release jitter of the
interfering packet φj and its maximum indirect interference
jitter. As shown in [9], Kj is equal to the worst case response
time Rj of task τj which produces φj , assuming that φj will
be released immediately after the end of τj’s execution. Rj
can be calculated using uniprocessor response time analysis,
considering the type of task scheduling by the operating
system at each core (e.g. priority-preemptive). And as shown
in [22], the indirect interference jitter KIj can be bound by
Sj − Lj .
It can be seen in Equation 1 that the route of a packet
affects its worst-case latency because it defines the set of
packets that can add to the interference term of the equation
(i.e. sum operator). Route randomisation would change the set
interf(i) at each packet release, since different routes would
produce different interference patterns. An intuitive way to find
the worst-case latency of a packet with a randomised route
would be to calculate the worst-case latency of each of its
possible routes with Equation 1, and pick the highest value.
However, that approach works only if there is a single packet
with randomised route, and all others following deterministic
routes.
A general analysis where all packets could potentially have
randomised routes is more complex: all possible routes of
a packet would have to be tested with all possible routes
of all other packets before the worst case could be found.
Furthermore, if one cannot make probabilistic assumptions on
the randomisation approach, pathological cases must also be
taken into account (e.g. the same route could be chosen again
and again for a single packet over a long period of time, even
though that is very unlikely).
In this paper we assume that, in the worst case, if there is a
way for a high-priority packet to interfere with a low priority
packet, it would interfere with it in every possible release. This
means that even though there may be routes when packets do
not interfere with each other, we assume that in the worst case
the random choice of route would always pick the ones where
there is interference. This is perfectly reasonable when packets
have similar periods, but it gets more and more pessimistic
as we reduce the periods of higher priority packets. In that
case, high priority packets would have a larger number of
releases within a single release of a low priority packet, thus
interfering more often with it, even though the larger number
of releases would make less likely that an interfering route
would be chosen every time.
To calculate worst-case latencies for the general problem
where all packets could have randomised routes, we define
the set interfr(i) as the set of higher priority packets φj
who could, with any of their possible routes, interfere with
any of the possible routes of the packet of interest φi. To
precisely define that set, we must first define a new function
router(pia, pib) = {λa1, λ12, λ13, λ14, . . . , λmb}, denoting the
subset of Λ that contains all the links that could be part
of any of the routes that could be randomly chosen to
transfer packets from core pia to core pib, and a new function
mapr(φi) = router(map(τi),map(τd)). Then, interfr(i) =
{φj ∈ φ : mapr(φi) ∩mapr(φj) 6= ∅}.
By applying Equation 1 with the summation over the set
interfr(i) instead of the original interf(i), we can then
find an upper bound to the packet latencies over a NoC with
randomised routing.
C. Optimising the Performance-Security Trade-off
The analysis proposed above can only be used to test
whether a particular randomised NoC configuration can meet
all hard real-time constraints of an application, but offers no
alternatives in case of negative results. In this subsection we
show how such analysis can be exploited as a fitness function
in a design space exploration process. Similarly to [18] and [9],
we follow an evolutionary approach to navigate over a key
part of the design space: task-core mapping. By changing that
mapping, it is possible to achieve fine-grained improvements
on schedulability of tasks over cores and packet flows over
NoC infrastructure (e.g. tasks that are barely unschedulable
can become schedulable by a simple remapping of one of the
higher priority tasks that interfere with their computation or
communication, thus changing the set interf in Equation 1).
The same can happen in the case of route randomisation, since
changes on mapping can determine which randomised routes
interfere with each other and in turn affect schedulability
through changes in the interfr set.
Figure 2 shows the evolutionary pipeline proposed here,
which start with an arbitrary population of task mappings
using a given route randomisation approach and a given
level of security. It then uses evolutionary operators such as
mutation and crossover to improve the mapping population
with regards to the percentage of schedulable tasks and packets
calculated using the proposed modification of Equation 1.
For every generation of the population, those with the larger
number of schedulable tasks and packets are selected to the
next generation, where they will be again mutated, crossed-
over, evaluated and selected to the subsequent generation. The
pipeline stops after a fully schedulable mapping is found, or
a predefined maximum number of generations is reached.
Unlike many constructive task mapping approaches, the
evolutionary pipeline proposed here does not necessarily try
to map communicating tasks to the same or neighbouring
cores. Its fitness function can be tuned, for instance, to keep
communicating tasks as far apart as possible while keeping
their communication packets schedulable over a variety of
randomly-chosen routes.
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Fig. 2: Evolutionary pipeline
In this paper, we consider two types of route randomisation
which can be implemented either as source or distributed
routing, namely random XY/YX and random west-first. Ran-
dom XY/YX is a randomised version of pseudo-adaptive XY
routing used in [3], so the route of the packet to its destination
is randomly chosen between the XY or the YX route prior
to the injection of the packet header into the network. In
random west-first, we randomise one of the turn model routing
approaches [6] so that whenever a packet is allowed more
than one route it randomly chooses one of them (i.e. uniform
probability among all alternatives).
We then allow for multiple levels of security by changing
how many packet flows are allowed to have their routes
randomised. A baseline with no randomisation should have
the best results regarding schedulability, given that packets
suffer less interference and therefore are more likely to be
schedulable. Then, increased levels of security can be achieved
by randomised larger percentages of packet flows, up to a fully
randomised configuration where all packets follow randomised
routes on every release. In the next section, we show experi-
mentally that the proposed schedulability test and evolutionary
optimisation pipeline can produce NoC configurations able
to hold hard real-time guarantees with maximised security
potential.
V. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
We evaluate the proposed approach in two distinct ex-
perimental setups. The first uses the proposed schedulability
test and evolutionary pipeline to balance the trade-off be-
tween performance guarantees and security over a large set
of synthetically generated applications. The second uses a
cycle-accurate NoC simulator to show the effects of route
randomisation upon latency with a realistic application.
A. Schedulability-driven optimisation of route randomisation
To evaluate the challenge of optimising different applica-
tions with different levels of load, we synthetically generate
thousands of applications, each of them composed of tasks
that communicate with each other with different numbers
of packet flows. We then apply the evolutionary pipeline
presented in Figure 2 to each one of those applications, aiming
to optimise the mappings of tasks in such a way that the whole
set of tasks and flows is schedulable at the highest possible
level of security. We then plot the percentage of schedulable
applications we could achieve for each level of security and
each level of load. For the sake of reproducibility, we provide
below more details on the whole process.
For a single experiment upon a given NoC and set of
parameters (e.g. topology, operating frequency, switch and link
latencies), a range of packet flow counts are identified, each
of which represents a level of load upon the NoC. For each
flow count, a set of tasksets and packet flowsets are generated,
each containing the chosen number of flows. The number of
tasks is kept roughly constant, and all of them are either source
or destination of at least one packet flow. Therefore, flowsets
with higher flow counts represent increasing packet contention
between the same endpoints. Flows are assigned to particular
source and destination tasks with uniform random probability.
This implies that the average number of flows transmitted
is even across all tasks, although as a result of the random
assignment there may be hotspots.
An experiment is initialised by defining a population of
initial mappings, and a setting the target level of security. The
levels of security settings are defined as either unsecured, or
25%, 50%, 75% and 100% secured flows. The secured flows
are those that will use randomised routing, providing increased
potential protection against side-channel attacks. In case of a
partial provision of security e.g. 50%, security is assigned to
the flows in their order of priority, with the highest priority
flows being randomised. The rationale is to enforce overall
random interference patterns, since higher priority packets are
the ones causing interference.
We then follow the evolutionary pipeline from Figure 2,
using a fitness function based on the modified Equation 1
to evalute each individual mapping. This is done separately
for each level of security, each of them generating a different
interfr(i) set representing the randomised routes of different
packet flows.
By applying the modified Equation 1 for every packet flow
of the application, it is possible to check whether each of
them is schedulable within a given mapping, i.e. their end-to-
end latency is less than the respective deadline. The overall
fitness of a mapping is then assumed to be the number of
schedulable packet flows it can achieve. After such evaluation,
the population is culled to retain only the mappings that are at
the top of the fitness ranking. The pipeline ends if a mapping
can make all flows schedulable, or a maximum number of
generations is reached.
To show the impact of the level of security on performance
guarantees and resource usage, we have produced several
experimental series:
No security (NS) Deterministic routing, fitness function in-
corporates schedulability calculated using Equation 1
with the original interf(i) set.
Percentage security (PS(%)) A given percentage of the
packet flows use randomised routing, fitness function
evaluated using Equation 1 with the proposed interfr(i)
set reflecting that percentage.
Application of security a posteriori (SAP) Evolution
is performed using a fitness function that tests the
schedulability without any security mechanisms (only
deterministic routing), aiming to find a schedulable
mapping without security considerations. Following the
completion of this evolutionary process, the evolved
best application mapping has 100% of its packet routes
randomised, and is then evaluated with Equation 1 with
the proposed interfr(i) set. This experiment therefore
aims to show that the optimisation of the mapping should
take into account route randomisation, and that poor
results can be expected from applying randomisation to
a mapping that was optimised for deterministic routing.
The first plot in Figure 3 shows that, for experiments with
increasing number of flows (i.e. increasing load over the NoC),
the propotion of schedulable flows decreases as expected.
Different levels of percent security (PS) produce similar results
as the unsecured setup (NS), showing that the evolutionary
pipeline was able to find mappings that randomised routes
only when the additional overheads could be tolerated. In the
SAP setup, route randomisation is added to a mapping that has
evolved without any concern for randomisation, and its poor
results serve as evidence of the superiority of the approach
proposed here, where the evolution pipeline aims to jointly
optimise mapping and randomisation. The second plot is based
on the same data, but plots the percentage of schedulable
TABLE I: Evaluation parameters
NoC/Packet flowset parameters Value
Maximum packet flow no-load latency 100 ms
Maximum period 500 ms
Priority assignment Deadline monotonic
Route randomisation Random XY/YX
Standard NoC topology 4x4
Enlarged NoC topology 8x8
Flowsets per data point 100
GA parameters
Population size 100
Mutation individual task moving probability 0.3
Maximum generations 50
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Fig. 3: Flow and flowset schedulability results for 4x4 (left) and 8x8 (right) NoCs
flowsets (i.e. a flowset is only considered schedulable if every
flow within it is schedulable). The third and fourth plots also
show percentage of schedulable flows and flowsets, but for
larger flowsets mapped over a larger NoC (8x8). Those results
show a greater separation between the NS and PS series after
NoC evolution, due to the greater complexity of interference
patterns over longer network paths when randomised routing
is enabled.
B. Cycle-accurate simulation of route randomisation
This section uses simulation to evaluate the impact of
route randomisation on the latency of an autonomous vehicle
application described in [9].
The simulation framework used for this section is a cycle-
accurate NoC model with support for priority preemption and
virtual channels. This simulator has been extensively validated
in our previous work, frequently being used as a baseline for
results in latency and power analysis [10] [7].
1) Application Structure: The autonomous vehicle (AV)
application consists of 38 communicating flows between a
set of tasks that represent video processing, system monitor-
ing and control for a robotic vehicle. Priorities are defined
such that lower priority index values represent the highest
priority transmissions. The priorities, data transmission rates,
frequencies and deadlines of these application transmissions
are as defined in [9], although a different mapping has been
used in order to show the impact of routing protocols on a
randomly selected mapping without artificial tuning to favour
a particular routing protocol. The application has been mapped
onto a 4x3 NoC, and the video resolution of the AV application
video streams is 640x480. Since the application mapping is
static and a single priority level is used per packet, a packet
always travels between a fixed source-destination pair during
the simulation.
2) Routing Alternatives: We compare a baseline XY rout-
ing with two randomised approaches. The first uses XY/YX,
and traffic producers choose randomly upon injection whether
a data packet will use XY or YX routing. Following this
decision, a flag is set in the data packet to control the routing
behaviour. As a result, the chosen routing algorithm (either
XY or YX) is used throughout packet transmission.
The second approach is random west-first (RWF) routing.
Its semi-deterministic mechanism requires the packet always
to be forwarded towards the west when the destination node is
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Fig. 4: Communication latency results for the randomised
routing case on the AV application
west of the current node. However, any other destination port
can be chosen randomly (east, north or south) as long as the
direction taken is towards the destination. Therefore, the RWF
approach permits a more diverse range of transmission paths
than the XY/YX selection approach, providing more potential
protection against side channel attacks.
3) Evaluation Results: The results are presented in Figure
4, illustrating the max-min-mean latencies for the randomised
routing cases (XY/YX and RWF) versus the baseline. The
results illustrate that routing randomisation typically increases
the communication latencies for the majority of packets com-
pared to fixed XY routing. This is particularly evident in
the case of the packets with priority 8 under RWF routing,
which experience an increased latency due to contention with
other higher priority flows on some of the randomly chosen
routes. In the XY/YX routing case, increased latency is also
observed for the packets with priorities 21 and 26 in some
cases. Interestingly, for some of the packet transmissions with
priority 10 and 13, the use of randomised routing results in
reduced latency in the best case, either by routing a higher
priority packet so that it no longer causes interference, or
routing the current packet around the interferer.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has addressed the trade-off between security and
hard real-time performance guarantees in Networks-on-Chip.
It has proposed route randomisation as a way to increase NoC
resilience against side-channel attacks, and has discussed a
number of design alternatives for the randomisation approach.
It then has proposed a schedulability test for applications
running over a secure priority-preemptive NoCs using route
randomisation. Finally, the paper identifies an optimisation
pipeline which can be guided by the proposed schedulability
test towards configurations that can achieve full schedulability
while maximising the provided level of security. Extensive
experimental work using 4x4 and 8x8 NoCs with random
XY/YX routing running thousands of synthetically generated
applications show the performance guarantees that can be
achieved by the proposed approach at four different levels
of security, compared against two baselines (no security, and
full security applied a posteriori). Additional experiments with
a realistic application running over 4x3 NoCs with random
XY/YX and random west-first routing were performed with a
cycle-accurate simulator, aiming to show the impact of route
randomisation on latency variability, which in turn shows the
increased resilience against side-channel attacks.
Since this is the first paper addressing the trade-off between
security and hard real-time performance in NoCs, it had to
make several assumptions to be able to attack the problem.
Lifting some of those assumptions will certainly open new
avenues of research, such as using different NoC arbitration
mechanisms (e.g. TDM) or different route randomisation tech-
niques (e.g. if randomised routes of subsequent releases of
packets are never the same, a less pessimistic schedulability
test can be used). Addressing those cases will require new
schedulability tests, but could still reuse the proposed optimi-
sation pipeline.
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